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TheTraditional Industries
PartThree presents detailed studies of the competitiveness of Egypt's
major modern manufacturing industries in the fifties and sixties, particularly
during the years around the devaluation of 1962. Evaluation is based primarily
on estimates of effective rates of protection (ERPs) and domestic resource
costs (DRCs) for each individual industry.
The details of the estimates have been published elsewhere.1 Here we
shall only point out that they are based upon detailed output and cost infor-
mation for the individual industries and not upon input-output tables and input
coefficients implied by such tables. Input-output tables for less developed
countries are usually quite unreliable and may not always utilize all available
data; moreover, in the case of Egypt, no adequate up to date input-output
table has been available to the authors. Hence, only those industries for which
sufficient information about inputs and outputs could be obtained are included
here. They include ten manufacturing industries, of which four are traditional
and six are new. Measured by value added, they cover 26.2 percent of manu-
facturing industry with over ten workers per establishment and 22.8 percent
of all establishments (see Table 8—1). Measured by wages and salaries paid,
the coverage is 29.3 percent, and by employment, 28.1 percent (in both cases
for establishments of over ten workers). While the coverage of modern manu-
facturing is certainly higher, we clearly cannot claim that our sample is repre-
sentative. In addition, the estimates of ERPs and DRCs are of widely differing
quality, indicating, for some industries, orders of magnitude at best.
The years taken for study depend entirely upon availability of data. For































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.206 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
be studied; for three industries, data were available for only one year after the
devaluation. Comparability is, thus, quite limited for several reasons.
In regard to interpretation, we emphasize that the industries were subject
to several kinds of government intervention during the fifties and sixties, of
which foreign exchange control is only one (and perhaps not even the most
important one). All large industries were nationalized in 1961 or 1963, and
have been exposed to both price and trade controls. Their investment programs
have been designed by the government, and interference with their production
programs through allocation of foreign exchange, specification of the type and
source of inputs to be used, as well as the direction of output has been fre-
quent. In addition, they were forced to increase both employment and wages
in 1961 and 1962. To separate the impact of these various forces is exceed-
ingly difficult, if not impossible.
This chapter is devoted to the traditional industries—cotton textiles
(spinning and weaving), sugar, and cement—which (except sugar) were
established in the early days of the country's industrialization around the turn
of the century. When free trade was the prevailing dogma, particularly under
British rule, they all had to struggle—and survive—with little protection, even,
at times, with negative protection. Partly because of their early strength and
partly because of government support, they have grown to become the largçst
employers and foreign exchange earners in the modern manufacturing sector.
The position of some important new industries, largely established after
World War II, will be examined in Chapter 9. They represent an attempt to
broaden the industrial structure toward the manufacture of basic intermediate
products for which a large domestic market exists. The industries in this group
are: phosphate fertilizers, nitr4te fertilizers, paper, rubber tires, iron and steel,
and automobiles.
The results obtained in the individual industry studies will be used in
Chapter 10 for a general evaluation of resource use in manufacturing.
THE COTTON SPINNING AND WEAVING
INDUSTRY
Historical Development.
Modern cotton textile manufacture in Egypt dates back to the first
decades of the nineteenth century, when Mohammed Au monopolized weaving
and trading in cotton textiles and introduced large-scale cotton spinning.2
Between 1818 and 1820 a number of cotton spinning mills were set up with
European machines, together with bleaching and dyeing establishments. They
were not successful, but the introduction of long staple cotton cultivation gave
further stimulus to government investment in the industry. By 1833 thirtyTHE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 207
factories were in operation; at the peak of their activity in the late 1820s,
they employed about 30,000 workers. Power was mostly provided by tread-
mills propelled by mules and buffaloes, although in some cases steam engines
were imported. Jennies and looms were largely manufactured domestically,
by Egyptian carpenters working under the direction of French technicians.
Appraisals of Mohammed Au's industrialization ventures differ widely.
There are reports of gross inefficiency, to which the centralized administration
of the cotton mills probably contributed, but it seems that the industry was
able to hold its own in the production of coarse cloth. Nominal protection
was virtually nil and imports were, in principle, free (from 1820), but the
armed forces provided an assured market and Mohammed Au had the power
to interfere with the importation of goods and to force his subjects to purchase
domestic products. Substantial exports of yarn to Europe and of fabrics to
Arab areas took place, and Indian muslins were gradually replaced by domes-
tic products.3 Toward the end of Mohammed All's reign, the industry declined.
After various military defeats and the treaty of 1838 between the Powers and
the Sublime Porte, which effectively removed all trade obstacles (apart from
low import and export taxes) by abolishing monopolies, he was no longer able
to finance the factories (which were operating at big losses). A large increase
in cotton goods imports—mostly of yarn and fine cloth—ensued, and weaving
and dyeing of coarse cloth adapted to domestic tastes survived only at the
handicraft level, particularly in Upper Egypt.
A second attempt to establish a modern textile industry was made toward
the end of the century. A spinning mill with 20,000 spindles was built in Cairo
by the Egyptian Cotton Mills Company (founded in 1899), while an inte-
grated mill, the Anglo-Egyptian Spinning and Weaving Company, was built
at Alexandria.4 Both mills had some prospects for success since they oriented
their operations toward a large domestic demand for coarse yarns spun from
ordinary domestic cotton from Upper Egypt, which was replaced by low-
grade Indian and Syrian cotton whenever the former was considered too
expensive. Moreover, the mills were protected by relatively high transporta-
tion costs and by the 8 percent customs duty applied to all imports. But no
sooner had the first factory started operations in 1901 when a countervailing
excise tax of 8 percent was imposed, nullifying the external tariff. The excise
tax was pushed by Lord Cromer personally in the name of free trade, but
probably also under pressure from the Lancashire industry. The fact that the
excise tax was not imposed across the board on all import-competing indus-
tries (cement, for example) lends force to this argument.5 Since the cotton
mills had to pay duty on all imports—raw cotton as well as coal, dyes, and
machinery8—they suffered, in effect, a negative "protection." The two compa-
nies had great difficulties to show profits and in 1907 the Egyptian Cotton
Mills Company had to close down. The Anglo-Egyptian survived somewhat208 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
longer, benefiting from a five-year suspension of the excise tax granted by
Cromer's successor. Nonetheless, it had to be reo,rganized by a German group
in 1912 as the Filature Nationale d'Egypte. Contemporary observers hint at
taxation as the basic difficulty of the industry. But Egypt's cottage industry,
too, had difficulties in surviving. A 1909 survey of the weaving industry in
Assiout notes that all the cotton yarn used there came from Europe and, in
particular, from Lancashire.7 Cotton spinning seems to have been virtually
nonexistent outside the two modern mills. Moreover, hand-weaving "was
declining on account of the competition from Europe. The town had only 70
looms while a few years ago it had Itis significant that the small town
of Akhmin in Upper Egypt was considered to be "the cotton center" because
it provided yarn to the surrounding villages for weaving and was the recipient
of their cloth.9
The industry prospered temporarily when trade was disrupted during
World War J,lO but stagnation returned in the early 1920s (Table 8—2). Thus,
the industrial census of 1927 lists only 27,184 people as occupied in the
textile industry as a whole, and mostly in fibers other than cotton. Only sixty-
four establishments in cotton spinning and weaving had more than ten
employees and only two were considered modern." A compilation of factories
founded from 1884 to 1951 does not indicate the opening of a single new
textile factory during the two decades between 1907 and 1927.12
In addition to taxation of the industry, a law was passed in 1916 pro-
hibiting the importation of foreign raw cotton for domestic consumption,
TABLE 8-2
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allegedly to protect domestic cotton from foreign plant diseases. Whether this
motivation was only a pretext for a protectionist measure or not, it certainly
served the interests of the big landlords—the major cotton growers—very well.
On the other hand, it dealt a severe blow to the textile industry, the main
natural advantage of which lay in satisfying the mass demand for cheap cloth,
for which domestic cotton was of too high a quality and hence too expensive.
As far back as 1898, Egyptian spinning mills had been importing Indian short
staple cotton to produce coarse cloth at competitive prices. The impact of the
1916 measure was fully realized in 1925, when the excise tax on Egyptian
cotton manufactures was finally abolished. Unable to compete in the foreign
market for coarse products because of high raw material costs, the industry
thus became restricted to a protected market, sheltered at first by the general
8 percent tariff and eventually by higher rates when Egypt obtained tariff
autonomy in 1930. In the expectation of higher tariffs, the Bank Misr founded
a small factory in 1927 that later grew into a giant, with over a quarter of a
million spindles: the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company at Mahalla El
Kubra. More spectacular at the time, however, was the expansion of the
Filature Nationale from 20,000 spindles in 1917 to 60,000 spindles in 1931.
When tariff autonomy was obtained in 1930, Egypt immediately raised
the tariff on yarn and cloth from 8 to 12 percent. It was raised again on
several occasions, until it reached LE1O per 100 kg. on yarn of lower counts,
that is, roughly 30 percent of the import price in 1949. As a result of the
tariff measures, production trebled and imports declined (Table 8—2). Value
added data do not extend back to the 1930s, but the 1937 census reveals that,
second only to the tobacco industry, the textile industry as a whole surpassed
all other manufacturing sectors (including food) in terms of value of assets.13
Bearing in mind differences in capital intensity, it may very well have been
the leading manufacturing activity in terms of value added (at the two-digit
level) in 1937.
World War II led to a further expansion of the industry, together with an
enormous improvement in its financial position. Most companies were able to
write off their equipment within a short period of time (six years in the case
of the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company), to accumulate large stocks of
raw materials and manufactured goods, and to build up their financial reserves
substantially.'4 Consequently, the industry was able not only to replace its old
equipment completely after the war but also to finance further new invest-
ments.15 Thus, imports of textile machinery rose from 1,100 tons in 1940 to
an annual average of 11,500 tons during the period 1946_1950.16
Toward the end of the 1940s a number of smaller mills had difficulties
in marketing their products, particularly coarse materials. The main reason
given was the excessive cost of domestic cotton in the production of coarse
yarns.'7 And as the demand from the Allied Forces in Egypt petered out after
the war, the industry found itself saddled with excess capacity, protected by210 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
relatively high tariffs, but unable to export. The problem raised by the high
cost of producing coarse cloth on the basis of high quality domestic cotton
was tackled by imposing an export tax in 1948 on all varieties of cotton. In
addition, a subsidy was granted in 1949 to help local mills export their surplus
production.'8
To satisfy domestic demand for cheap cotton cloth, large spinning and
weaving mills were, in addition, subjected to a system of government-fixed
prices on low-grade cloth in This measure, which became a permanent
feature of the Egyptian economy, was one of the first direct, large-scale govern-
ment interventions in the price mechanism for manufactured products after
the war. The subsidy system was suspended in April 1950 on the assumption
that the high export tax on raw cotton would provide sufficient protection.
Textile exports fell, however, until August, but started rising again under the
stimulus of the increasing world demand related to the Korean War.2°
After the Korean boom, textile exports fell nearly to half the level
reached in 1951 and concern was voiced again about the need to stimulate
demand for the industry's output. In 1953 two protective measures were
taken: customs duties on cotton textiles were increased, and a fund for the
"consolidation of the spinning and weaving industry" was created. The fund,
financed by export taxes on cotton, was aimed primarily at promoting exports
by coordinating the marketing effort abroad, by reorienting production toward
the specifications of foreign demand, and by granting subsidies to cotton
textile exporters.2' After the elimination of the export tax on raw cotton at
the end of the fifties, the export subsidies for textiles were financed by an
excise tax of 2.5 to 5 percent, later increased to 6 percent, on the value of
the raw cotton consumed by the spinning mills.
Significantly, voices were now raised once again to the effect that any
long-run solution to the problems of the Egyptian cotton textiles industry had
to be based on permitting imports of cheap short staple cotton.22 Although
moves in this direction were taken after 1965, as we shall see below, this issue
has never been squarely faced by the government. The catastrophic conse-
quences of this on the competitiveness of the industry will be discussed in the
next twQ sections.
Cotton Yarn and Cloth: Production and Trade.
The production of cotton yarn experienced rapid growth between 1950
and 1971, with an average annual rate of 5.5 percent (Chart 8—1). Per capita
apparent consumption (production plus imports minus exports) of textiles
(cotton, wool, and synthetic fibers) increased by only 0.85 or 1.8 percent
annually, depending on whether the prosperous post—World-War II period or
the recession years 1952—1953 are taken as a Exports of cotton fabrics,THE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 211
which, supported by subsidies, began in 1948 after half a century of import
substitution, provided the major stimulus for the growth in production,
although the income redistribution that took place in the 1960—1971 period
may have also played a role.24
The growth of cotton textile exports, particularly of yarn, was mainly due
to the opening of a large market in Eastern Europe (Table 8—3). Yarns were
exported to Romania as early as 1954, and large exports of fabrics to Eastern
European countries began in 1964. Of the roughly 30,000-ton increase in
yarn exports from 1957 to 1966, almost 24,000 tons went to bilateral trade
Thousandtons
CHART 8-1




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.214 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
partners, who accounted for about 48 percent of Egypt's total exports of
cotton yarn and fabrics in 1970—71. Moreover, Egypt was also able to double
its exports to multilateral partners between 1957 and 1967. The growth rate
of exports slackened somewhat after 1965, although a number of new markets,
particularly among developing countries, were opened. From 1965 to 1971,
exports to multilateral markets fluctuated strongly in response to the business
cycles in the developed market economies.
While the volume of textile exports was steadily growing, unit values
were at best stagnant, if not falling. In this regard, however, it is essential to
distinguish between exports to multilateral and those to bilateral markets. In
1955, the unit values obtained in the two markets were virtually the same,
but gradually a relative increase in prices of yarn and cloth exported to bi-
lateral (mainly Eastern European) partners took place, particularly after the
Soviet Union became a large-scale importer of Egyptian textiles in the early
1960s. Table 8—3 shows that during the period 1964 to 1970 prices obtained
in the Eastern European markets for cotton yarn were almost double those in
Western markets. The explanation may be quality differences. Unfortunately,
we do not have a country-by-country distribution of yarn exports by count.
It is reasonable to assume, however, that the Soviet Union, a major short
staple cotton producer, would want to supplement its own coarse yarn produc-
tion by finer yarns from Egypt, particularly because its lagging production of
synthetic fibers compels it to use a relatively large proportion of long staple
cotton in its textile industry. Granted that exports to the Eastern European
countries are heavily weighted toward high count yarns, the trade statistics
still point to artificially high prices for such imports. It seems likely that the
bilateral trading arrangements have hiked the nominal Egyptian export prices,
and that the real prices obtained are elusive because they depend upon the
commodities (including weapons) received in exchange.25
Consequently, we shall take the unit values for multilateral yarn exports
as representative of world prices. Table 8—3 illustrates that, while average
export unit values of yarn in Egyptian currency were stagnant (or rose
slightly) from the mid-1950s to 1969—with due adjustment for the 1962
devaluation and the gradual increase in quality26—world prices actually fell.
This decline in world prices of cotton yarn is consistent with the virtual con-
stancy of the price of short staple cotton—the usual raw material base for
coarse yarns—between 1955—56 and 1970—71, with the large productivity
increases achieved in major producing countries over the period and the
competition from synthetic fibers. Hence, over time, Egypt has been receiving
less and less per standardized unit of yarn exported.
We may note that the margin between the value of a ton of Ashmouni
cotton (the main raw material used in spinning) and a ton of yarn at inter-
national prices is quite narrow, ranging between $250 and $300.27 When theTHE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 215
yarnprice is adjusted for cotton wasted in the process of spinning,28 even this
narrow margin vanishes. Thus, the unit values received for cotton exported in
the form of yarn (deducting 17 percent for waste) during the years 1964 to
1970 were approximately the same as the unit value obtained for direct exports
of the raw cotton (Ashmouni) (see Chart 8—2)Inthis sense, value added
in yarn production, evaluated at international prices, appears to be quite
small. This unfortunate circumstance, however, has much to do with the use of
medium-long staple cotton, such as Ashmouni, in the production of coarse
yarns. We shall return to this problem when the DRCs of the textile industry
are discussed.
CHART 8-2
Exports of Raw Cotton and Cotton Textiles, 1950—1972
Thousandtons
1950'52'54'56'58'60'62'64'66'68'70'72
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CHART 8-3
It is not possible to pursue a similar analysis of volume and unit value for
fabrics because of the large price differences between various degrees of finish
(gray cloth, bleached, dyed, and printed fabrics) and quality. Suffice it to
mention that Egyptian exports of cotton cloth in the mid-1950s were mainly in
the form of printed fabrics destined for Arab countries, where they benefited
from a taste preference. Hence, they fetched a relatively high price—about
$2,500 per ton. Broadening of the market with a shift toward semifinished
Cotton Prices,
'58'60'62
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cloth resulted in a gradual decline in unit values to an average of $1,658 in
1968—69: $1,850 in Arab countries, $2,200 in Eastern Europe, and $1,150
in other countries. Note that for fabrics, too, the price obthined in trade with
Eastern Europe is remarkably high.
Since 1966 exports of cloth to bilateral trade partners has been stabilized
at about 5,500 tons annually; all growth has been in the direction of other
trading partners, particularly the Arab countries, North America, and mem-
bers of the EFTA. But in all these markets, Egyptian textiles face stiff compe-
tition, and inability to meet specifications—however temporary—in a rapidly
changing pattern of demand easily results in loss of markets. The EEC coun-
tries and African countries can be cited as examples.
Within the framework of the GAIT Long-Term Agreement on Textiles,
a quota of 3,600 tons for cotton cloth exports to the EEC countries in
1970—71 was set for Egypt. A quota set a few years earlier had been increas-
ing by 4 percent annually. By 1969 only two-thirds of the quota was used,
and during the following two years Egyptian exports to the EEC region were
falling slightly.'0 In the markets opened by the GATT agreement (within the
quota limits), lack of competitiveness must have played a part in the Egyptian
lag. Also, Egypt has been unable to use up its quota in the United States, but
it is not clear to what extent this may be related to the somewhat strained
relations between the two countries. In any case, the GATT agreement has
not served effectively as a brake on Egyptian textile exports. In this regard
Egypt is in a position similar to that of India: lack of competitiveness is the
basic obstacle. In Africa, which accounted for most of the exports to non-
Arab developing countries, competing printed fabrics with "African" designs
from Eastern Europe reduced the Egyptian share of the market substantially
in such countries as Nigeria, Niger, Dahomey, and the Ivory Coast.31
CostsandRevenues, 1956to 1969—70.
Evaluationof the competitiveness of the textile industry is always fraught
with related to the diversity of both outputs and material inputs.
The increasingJntegration of spinning and weaving activities makes inde-
pendent evaluations of these activities more and more problematic, and, finally,
the export mix may differ substantially from the general product mix. In Egypt
the problems are compounded by the aggregation of cost and revenue data for
all plants employing more than ten workers. At best we can obtain a picture
of the average performance in the industry, but wide differences among estab-
lishments are known to exist in respect to productivity and efficiency; we have
not been able to evaluate separately the profitability and competitiveness of
those technologically advanced enterprises that specialize in exports and would
therefore be particularly interesting from our point of view.218 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
The available data permit us to estimate ERPs and DRCs for the joint
production of yarn and cloth in 1956 and 1960, for the production of cloth
in 1965—66, and for that of yarn in 1969—70. The 1956 and 1960 data are
comparable. Included are establishments with more than fifty workers, pri-
marily engaged in the production of yarn. The establishments processed about
half their production of yarn into cloth in 1956 and 44 percent in 1960. For
1969—70, the same types of establishments were studied, but their number
was reduced to sixteen through mergers and liquidation, and they all belonged
to the public sector. The cost data published for 1969—70 claim to pertain to
spinning only, and this, indeed, seems to be the case for the material inputs
costs, but not for labor and capital costs. Estimating that 30 percent of labor
had been occupied in weaving and other activities related to the production of
fabrics, we reduced both wage and capital costs on that crude basis by 30
percent.32 It follows that the estimates of ERPs and DRCs for 1969—70 are
not fully comparable to those for 1956 and 1960, and that the estimates for
the 1969—70 year are more shaky than those for the earlier two years.
For 1965—66, the data cover weaving establishments only. They include
eighteen large establishments in the public sector and 223 private establish-
ments, most of the latter having fewer than fifty workers.
On the revenue side, the main problem was to find export prices that
corresponded to the product mix for the establishments included in the four
years. Exported yarns do not differ significantly from those for domestic con-
sumption in regard to degree of finish but usually have higher counts. As
already mentioned, f.o.b. unit values for yarn exported to multilateral markets
have been used as-international prices for yarn, but they had to be adjusted
for differences in average counts. Fabric prices vary widely according to
degree of finish and quality, and the product mix sold for domestic consump-.
tion differs substantially from the export mix. Domestic consumption consists
mainly of dyed and printed fabrics, while exports include large quantities of
gray cloth in bulk. Exports to Arab countries, however, consist largely of
finished fabrics similar to those marketed domestically. Hence, unit values for
fabrics sold in the Arab countries may be used as an approximation for the
prices that domestically marketed fabrics could obtain in multilateral exports.
It should be emphasized, therefore, that the available data do not permit
accurate calculations of ERPs and DRCs; the results presented in Table 8—4
atbest indicate broad orders of magnitude. The calculations for this industry
are less reliable than those for the industries discussed later.
The Competitiveness of the Cotton Textile Indusfry.
The immediate impression from Table 8—4isthat of an industry with a












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































p220 PROTECTION,CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
pression may be misleading as a guide to the future—provided the government
is prepared to permit imports of short staple cotton.
The effective rate of protection was 31 percent in 1956 and increased to
62 percent before the devaluation of In 1965—66 ERP was 68 percent
for fabrics and in 1969—70 213 percent for yarn. Since changes in foreign
prices and productivity were relatively small between these two years, it seems
clear that effective protection was much higher for yarn than for fabrics, a
phenomenon that is closely related to the relatively high prices obtained for
Egyptian fabrics in Arab countries. It also seems clear that a product mix
similar to that underlying the ERPs for 1956 and 1960 must have enjoyed
a much higher degree of effective protection after the devaluation than
before.
Domestic resource costs show a similar picture. At 10 percent return to
capital, DRC in 1956 was already considerably higher than the official ex-
change rate, 46.8 piasters for the U.S. dollar against 35.2 piasters, and in
1960 it increased to 55.9 piasters (but see footnote 33). The DRC for fabrics
in 1965—66 was 69.7 piasters, and for yarn in .1969—70, 85.9 piasters. For a
comparable product mix it would seem that the DRC had increased from
about 55 piasters before the devaluation of 1962 to.around 80 plasters in the
mid-sixties. While the official devaluation in 1962 amounted to 24 percent
and the effective devaluation was lower, DRC increased by 40 to 50 percent.
The industry was, thus, far from competitive, even at the "realistic" rate of
61 piasters, suggested by the IMF in 1966, and its competitiveness shows
deterioration.
This gloomy picture of the leading Egyptian manufacturing industry rests,
of course, on the assumption that the raw material basis of the industry is
domestic cotton. We have already pointed out that the competitiveness of the
industry is impaired by the ban on cotton imports: the industry is forced to
use expensive, high-quality cotton for producing coarse qualities of yarn and
fabrics that could equally well be made with cheaper, low-quality cotton such
as American Middling 15/16 or Indian cotton. To quantify the impact of this
trade restriction, we include in Table 8—4 DRCs calculated on the assumption
of a shift in the raw material base to foreign cotton purchased at international
prices about 20 percent below those of the Egyptian varieties actually used.
The improvement in the competitive position is striking: DRC in 1956 would
have been about the same as the official exchange rate at that time, and only
slightly higher in 1960. In 1969—70, DRC for yarn would have been con-
siderably higher than the official exchange rate (54.4 plasters against 43.5)
but considerably lower than the "realistic' rate of 61 plasters.
We note that not only would the level of the DRCs be much lower if
production were based on imported cotton, but also their increase during the
• sixties would have been lower—44 percent against the actual increase of 54
percent. This is related to the fact that long-staple prices increased in relationTHE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 221
to short-staple prices during the sixties, which by itself makes the substitution
of short for long-staple cotton as an input more attractive. But this price trend
may be reversed in the future.
It should be added that our calculations at this point are particularly
crude and that they do not take into account the possible external costs that
originally were the motivation (or pretext) for the ban on foreign cotton, i.e.,
the risk of importing new plant diseases. We are not in a position to judge how
serious that risk really is, and we do not want to belittle the problem. How-
ever, the fact that the government has permitted some importation of cheap
Indian and Chinese cotton as well as low-grade yarn in recent years shows a
growing awareness of the possible gains from such a policy and perhaps also
indicates that the risks may have been exaggerated.
If the textile industry were to base its production on foreign cotton, the
domestic cotton now consumed by the industry at home would have to be ex-
ported. On that basis, in 1960 the industry would have been producing at a
DRC of 37.8 piasters, with the replaced cotton produced at a DRC of 30.8
piasters (Table 8—4, col. 7); a devaluation of less than 10 percent would
have sufficed to make the textile industry competitive. For 1969—70 the cor-
responding DRCs were 54.4and45.0plasters.Even the replaced cotton
would here require a slight devaluation (beyond that of 1962) to be com-
petitive, but both textiles and replaced cotton would be highly competitive at
the realistic rate of 61 piasters.
Table 8—4, finally, contains an estimate of the DRCs for cotton cultiva-
tion and spinning considered as an integrated activity. One reason for making
this calculation is that there are great difficulties in gauging the international
price for the low grade, medium staple varieties actually consumed by the
textile industry. Were Egypt faced with a downward-sloping foreign demand
curve for cotton lint, an attempt to export the cotton now used by the textile
mills would result in a marginal revenue correspondingly lower than its current
export price. In that case there might be an advantage in selling it in the form
of textiles, if demand is more elastic for the latter than for the former. In
treating cultivation and spinning as an integrated activity, we sidestep the
problem of the international price of cotton. The DRCs thus obtained fall,
as they should, in between the DRCs for the industry and cotton cultivation
considered as separate activities. For 1960 (at a 10 percent return), the DRC
was 36.6 piasters for the integrated activity and 55.9and30.8 piasters, respec-
tively, for the independent activities. Hence, the integrated activity was almost
competitive at the official rate.
In Table 8—5 we present the implicit tariff rates for cotton yarn, dyed
and printed fabrics, and rayon yarn, calculated as the percentage difference
between actual domestic and international prices. They show the nominal pro-
tection and, at the same time, give an impression of the government's domestic
price policy for textiles.222 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
TABLE 8-5
Implicit Tariff Rates for Textiles
(percent)
Commodity 1956 1960 1965—66
Cotton yarn 7.5 20.6 39.3
Dyed and printed cotton fabrics 12.2 13.0 48.5
Rayon yarn 18.2 19.8 80.2
SOURCE: Hansen and Nashashibi, NBER Working Paper No. 48, New York, 1975.
In 1956 the implicit tariff rates were quite low; at that time protection was
largely provided through the export taxes on cotton. By 1960 the level of
implicit tariff rates was on the rise, despite the abolition or reduction of export
taxes on various varieties of cotton. By 1965—66 a very substantial increase
in nominal protection had taken place, the implicit tariff rate having doubled
for yarn, more than trebled for fabrics, and quadrupled for rayon yarn. This
development is also reflected in the official wholesale price index, which shows
a rise in the textiles subindex of 4 percent from 1955 to 1960 and of another
24 percent from 1960 to 1965. The domestic price rise was strong enough to
permit an increase in the actual rate of return on capital for the industry from
12.6 percent in 1956 to 13.0 percent in 1965—66 and 20.3 percent in 1969—70
(Table 8—4).
Productivity Developments.
A look at productivity trends may throw some light on the causes which
may have led to the declining competitiveness of Egypt's cotton textile industry.
During the last two decades, productivity in textile manufacturing has in-
creased rapidly throughout the world. Apart from technological developments,
which have heightened the speed of ring spinning frames and looms and inte-
grated a number of functions,34 productivity has increased in many countries
as a result of rationalizing the industry by scrapping old plants and replacing
them with modern ones. Moreover, the high capital intensity associated with
the new technology has meant a much higher rate of plant utilization and
hence a shorter lifetime.35 Consequently, technical innovations embodied in
new equipment have been disseminated rapidly in developed Western coun-
tries and Japan, with per capita output more than doubled in the last fifteen
years and operating costs drastically reduced.3° The labor-saving innovations
(such as the shuttle-less loom) may not have been to the advantage of develop-
ing countries, but they certainly improved the competitiveness of the developed
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In Table 8—6 we have attempted to illuminate productivity developments
for labor and capital in the cotton spinning and weaving industries of Egypt.
Ideally, capital productivity should be measured by output per hour of Operat-
ing machines (rings). This information is not available, and since output per
spindle-hour is available only as the product of capacity utilization and num-
ber of spindles installed, we prefer to simply reproduce these series. Capacity
utilization in spinning has been quite high and, if the data are reliable, it ex-
ceeds that of most countries surveyed by GATT.37 During the 1950s capacity
expanded steadily, with the number of spindles doubling from 1953 to 1960
at a high rate of utilization. During the first five-year plan (1960—61 to 1964—
65) and up to 1967, the industry seems to have been somewhat neglected.
Capacity utilization rose to the upper limits of feasibility—in 1967 it must
have actually hit the ceiling. This very high degree of capacity utilization was
detrimental to efficiency, partly because obsolete machinery had to be put into
operation. After 1967 a large increase in the number of spindles helped to im-
prove the situation.
A comparison of capacity utilization and output per spindle installed in-
dicates the impact of the introduction of new high-speed machinery. From
1966 to 1969—70, capacity utilization fell by 7 percent while output per
spindle installed rose by 5 percent. This development is consistent with the
increase in capital per employee.38
Such a development, however, implies that the industry has failed to
adjust its labor requirement to the new level of machinery performance.
Actually, there is evidence of substantial overstaffing, particularly during the
1960s. While labor productivity rose rapidly from 1956 to 1960, the increase'
seems to have been quite slow from 1960 to 1969—70. Shortcomings in the
data may be partly responsible for these results, but generally the situation is
similar to that in other industries with respect to overstaffing. In measuring
labor productivity, the long-term trend toward production of finer yarn has
not been taken into account, a circumstance that might explain the apparent
slowdown of productivity growth.30 However, in an interview with one of the
authors, a high official in the Ministry of the Economy affirmed that the in-
dustry excess of workers amounting to 20 percent of its labor force,
a situation that could not be remedied because of the resulting unemployment
with all its related problems. It has been suggested publicly that wages and
salaries of excess workers be shown separately in the accounts of an enter-
prise to reveal its true performance and possibly entitle it to compensation.
With respect to weaving, productivity trends are much more difficult to
measure because of the large variety of products with different degrees of
finish and quality. Measured simply as output in tons per loom installed, pro-
ductivity growth has been rapid, well above that in spinning. To some extent a
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This certainly was the case between 1960 and 1967. But, the rise in the
proportion of automatic looms (from 53percentin 1960 to 59 percent in
1967) must also have contributed to raising output per employee and output
per loom. The higher level of mechanization is evidenced by the sharp increase
in the capital-labor ratio.
Public versus Private Sector.
For the weaving industry some interesting information is available that
may throw some light on the retardation of productivity growth that char-
acterized the 1960s. Data on the structure of ownership show that about 30
percent of all mechanical looms (automatic and nonautomatic) in 1971 were
owned privately, mostly by 177 smaller establishments with fewer than fifty
workers. At the same time, some of those with over fifty workers—represent-
ing slightly less than one-fourth of the private firms—are quite large. To be
sure, the larger private establishments are tied to the public firms by permanent
contracts and operate under tight supervision and with fixed prices. Compara-
tive data for public and private enterprises have been published on the dis-
tribution of equipment, labor, and inventories in the weaving industry for the
year 1965—66. Unfortunately, no information is available on the distribution
of output and value of production in the two sectors. Nevertheless, the data
shown in Table 8—7 suffice to reveal interesting differences between the two
sectors and to give some insight into the operations of the public firms. The
distribution of equipment is included mainly for descriptive purposes; we
have no way of knowing which technique is optimal, given the type of cloth
to be produced, levels of wages and skills, and capital costs. If the prevailing
institutional constraints mean constant overstaffing in the public sector, then,
it could be argued, the lower the proportion of automatic looms the better!
The breakdown of employees shows a much higher proportion of opera-
tives in the private firms than in the public sector, which seems to be saddled
with an army of administrators and service employees. Although the higher
degree of mechanization in the public sector, with a higher proportion of
automatic looms, may require more maintenance work, this still does not
account for the large difference observed.
Finally, average monthly wages in the public sector are double those in
the private sector, where the average yearly man-hours are greater. This may
be justified, to some extent, by the greater skills necessary for the technological
sophistication of the public sector but, again, the large difference between the
two suggests higher compensation of labor in the public sector.
Inventories in the public sector were enormous: finished and semifinished
goods accounted for 30 percent of total annual output in the industry. ThisTHE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 227
TABLE8-7
Public versus Private Sectors in the Cotton Weaving Industry,
Public Private
Structure of Equipment
Hand looms 22 4,930









Administrators 9.5 J 2.4J
Owners, directors, and experts 0.8 2.8
Average man-hour per employee per year 1,842 2,170
Average monthly wage (LE) 20.79 9.07
Fringe 0.98 0.14
Inventories (000 LE)
Finished goods 15,529.6 117.9
Semifinished goods 12,861.1 4.4
Raw materials 7,586.8 134.9
Total 35,977.4 257.2
As percentage of total fixed assets 67.3 14.5
Souaca: The Cotton Weaving Jndustrj, CAGMS, March 1968.
fact is consistent with the general inventory growth in public firms noted for
1965—66 in the follow-up and appraisal of the first five-year plan. It is true
that for weaving this occurred in a period of slack demand (see Chapter 5),
andprivate subcontractors simply had to execute orders and deliver goods
to the public sector without bearing any responsibility for the marketing. Never-
theless, it reflects a failure in adjusting supply to demand: it should not be for-
gotten that demand was cut back deliberately to stop overheating the economy
and the pressures on the balance of payments, and, under such circumstances,
public enterprises should not keep production going at all cost.
To sum up, in the weaving industry, the effects of nationalization have
not been beneficial, and have probably been detrimental, to productivity and
general efficiency.228 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
THE SUGAR INDUSTRY
The modern sugar industry in Egypt dates back to the last century. The col-
lapse of cotton prices after the cotton famine of the 1860s prompted the
Khedive Ismail to look for other commercial crops for the khedival domains.
Cane cultivation appeared to be an appropriate alternative, sinceit was
particularly well suited to the soil and irrigation of Upper Egypt. Under the
basin irrigation system prevalent there at that time, only one (winter) crop
could be planted, and where perennial irrigation existed, cotton yields were
generally lower than in the North, all of which made cane cultivation attractive.
However, winter temperatures in Upper Egypt are too low for the use of com-
mon high-yielding cane varieties. Hence, the sugar yield in Egypt is usually
lower than that in the major growing countries.40 Directed and financed (via
foreign loans) by the Khedive, cane cultivation was expanded and a number
of sugar factories were established in Upper Egypi. It was a very large invest-
ment at the million. When the Khedive went bankrupt and was
deposed, the factories were taken over by Egyptian and French capitalists.41
Up to 1880 only raw or brown sugar was produced locally, and it had to
be exported to Marseilles for refining. In 1881 a Franco-Belgian company
built a refinery at Hawamdieh, near Cairo—the largest of its kind in the world
at that time—the capacity of which exceeded local production of raw sugar
and thus required imports from abroad. In 1892 it merged with the company
that had taken ovet the sugar factories originally built by the Khedive, and
in this form maintained a private monopoly on sugar production until 1961.
In 1905 the sugar company went bankrupt as a result of low prices and
the absence of any kind of protection. The industry was reorganized on a
smaller scale to be able to compete with imports of refined sugar; by 1910
cane acreage was reduced to 40,000 feddan from a maximum of 88,000 fed-
dan in 1901—1902. During World War I, with sugar imports difficult to secure,
the industry was revitalized, but it was threatened again during the Depression,
when pcices of sugar from Cuba and Java reached a low point. Consequently,
the government intervened in February 1931, imposing (variable) import
duties on sugar at a level sufficient to shelter domestic production. The govern-
ment was also authorized to fix the sugar cane acreage, the prices to be paid
by the company to cultivators, the quota of raw sugar to be imported for re-
fining, the quantity to be exported, and, finally, the price at which the refined
sugar was to be sold to consumers. "The price was to be such that after making
allowance for reserves and excise duty a minimum dividend of 5percentwas
guaranteed to shareholders and bondholders. Any surplus profits were to re-
vert in part to the government on a progressive scale."42 Ever since that time,THE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 229
the government has maintained its support of and close control over the sugar
industry. In 1956 it was "Egyptianized" and in 1961, of course,it was
nationalized.
Within the framework of the first five-year plan (1959—60 to 1964—65)
and the projected expansion of cane cultivation related to the construction
of the Aswan High Dam, a new government-owned sugar company was formed
to undertake the construction of a factory at Edfu. Four more factories were
constructed later and the old refinery at Hawamdieh was expanded. The in-
dustry branched into the production of cane and sugar derivatives—paper
pulp, grain board, vinegar, acetic acid, dry yeast, and cosmetics. Altogether,
£E48 million were invested in the sugar-based industry during the 1960s.
Sugar Production and Trade.
The development of raw sugar production from 1939 to 1971 is depicted
in Chart 8—4. Its fluctuations depend essentially on cane area planted and
yield per acre.43 The area planted is constrained by the water supply; cane
requires three times more water per acre than such alternative crops as cotton
or wheat. The sugar output series (with a one-year lag) is correlated with the
annual discharge of the Nile at Aswan.44
For almost four decades, from 1931, when sugar began receiving protec-
tion, until 1968, the sugar cane area remained roughly constant, fluctuating
between 80,000 and 100,000 feddan. The government attempted to maintain
the area within this range via the price mechanisms, increasing the price of
cane as costs of production rose.
A significant expansion of output occurred between 1952 and 1955, which
requires some explanation. Until the fall of 1952, sugar was rationed both
for consumer and industrial use. The government maintained a foreign trade
monopoly by imposing virtually prohibitive tariffs and taxes (exceeding 200
percent) on privately imported sugar.45 In September 1952 it liberalized the
consumption of sugar, setting a free market price that exceeded that of rationed
sugar by some 50 percent. There was no incentive for domestic supply to meet
the increase jn demand, with prices remaining unchanged. Alarmed by the
sharp rise in imports, the government increased producer prices in 1953, and
the cane area was expanded by 12 percent.46
More significant, however, was an increase in yield by 20 percent. This
was partly due to the application of more labor and greater care for the crop
made possible by the higher prices. Over the whole period from 1952 onward,
most progress was realized after the cane was cut; greater efficiency in sugar
extraction in the factories and a shorter time span between harvesting and
cane crushing had much to do with this phenomenon. A more accurate assess-
ment of cane maturity and the treatment of cane seeds with hot water, increas-230 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
CHART 8-4
Sugar: Production and Consumption, 1939—1971
ing resistance against viruses, also contributed to increasing the average sugar
content of cane from 9.29 percent in 1954 to 10.18 percent in 1960 and 11.33
percent in 1969. The completion of the Aswan Dam enabled the sugar cane
area to expand in 1969 and 1970 to almost 130,000 feddan without a fall
in yield.
The government's foreign trade policy in regard to sugar served two
purposes: it stabilized consumption and occasionally earned foreign exchange.
Fluctuations in the production of refined sugar were offset by imports of raw
sugar in case of a shortfall in domestic output or by exports of refined sugar
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incase of overproduction. In general, imports and exports occurred at the
same time, with imports consisting in raw sugar and exports, in refined sugar.
The latter was sold at a premium abroad, particularly to other Arab countries,
where it is in strong demand because of its higher level of sweetness than that
of other sugar varieties available in the world market. This fact also explains
the normally higher unit values for exports than for imports of refined sugar
(Table Imported sugar was mixed (after refining) with domestic
varieties and used for local consumption.
Because of the water constraint on supply and a rising population and
consumption, Egypt gradually shifted its position during the fifties and sixties
from net exporter of sugar to that of net importer (Chart 8.—4). By 1966 net
imports had reached 137,000 tons, or 24 percent of domestic consumption.
However, with water supply increased as a consequence of the High Dam,
sugar production rose 73 percent from 1966 to 1971, utilizing the new refining
capacity created since 1964 and once again turning Egypt into a net exporter.
Sugar Prices and Costs of Production.
Prices in the world sugar market are characterized by strong fluctuations.
Unless some long-term price is defined, at least within a certain range, profit-
ability calculations, particularly for planning purposes, become intractable.
Fortunately, the fluctuations shown in Table 8—8 seem to follow a. cyclical
pattern around a constant level. Starting in 1954, an upward movement of raw
sugar prices can be discerned, with a peak in 1957. A trough occurs in 1961,
with a new peak in 1963, and so on. The first two cycles are roughly of a six-
year duration, although the cycle beginning in 1967 seems somewhat longer
with what appears to be a peak in 1973. The average price was 3.58 U.S.
cents per pound for 1955—1960, 4.03 U.S. cents for 1961—1966, and 3.76
U.S. cents for the period 1967—1972. These averages are quite similar and
enable us to define a long-term price over the past eighteen years in the range
of 3.5 to 4.0 U.S. cents per pound.
For purposes of profitability calculations, we chose an average of three
cycle averages—3.79 U.S. cents per pound—as the world price to be measured
against domestic costs of sugar production for both 1960 and 1970, the two
years for which detailed information about domestic costs in processing is
available. This price corresponds to £E36.73 and £E45.87 per ton, c.i.f.
Alexandria, at the official rates prevailing before and after the 1962 devalua-
tion.48 Adding an average refining margin of $18.03 per ton,49 we obtain the
"long term" c.i.f. import prices for refined sugar of £E42.19 and £E52.00,
respectively, before and after 1962. We also calculated "short term" world
prices—three-year averages—confronting the industry around 1960 and 1970.
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Unlike the long-term world price, which has shown no clear trend over
the cycles during this period, domestic costs of sugar production in Egypt
have tended to rise both for cane cultivation and for processing. Since cane
has no international price, we have treated the sugar industry as an integrated
activity from cane cultivation to sugar refining.
Cost of Land, Capital, and Depreciation.
The competitiveness of the integrated sugar industry, from cane cultiva-
tion to refining, is gauged on the basis of effective rates of protection and do-
mestic resource costs per U.S. dollar. In calculating the DRCs, certain prob-
lems arise in connection with costs of land and capital services that are worth
noting.
To make comparisons among alternative uses of land, rents must be
evaluated as if they were not subject to control (see Chapter 7, p. 196). In
Chapter 7 the assumption was made that, without controls, rents would have
increased in proportion to output value since 1949. On that basis, the im-
puted rent for cane in 1961 was calculated to be £E32.78 per feddan, com-
pared with the official average maximum rent of £ E24.28, and on the same
grounds the imputed rent should be about £E32.00 for 1960. In 1967, the
last year for which cost data are available, average official rent for cane land
was £E23.OO, that is, slightly lower than in and, in line with the
policy of keeping land rentals unchanged, must have remained at about that
level till 1970, when actual (official) rent per feddan may be assumed to have
been £ E24.00. The assumption that market rents follow output value cannot
be upheld for such long periods, however, for in the long run rents do not fully
rise in proportion to agricultural value added. Total agricultural value added
increased by 85 percent from 1960—61 to 1969—70. Assuming the share of
rents to run along its historical trend,5' we could expect an increase in rent by
about 60 percent over the same period in the absence of controls. On that
basis, we are working with an imputed rent of £E5 1.00 per feddan for 1970.
Summarizing, we thus assume:
1960 1970
Average actual (official) rent
per feddan 23.85 24.00
Imputed market rent per feddan (LE) 32.00 51.00
In regard to returns to management and capital, the problem is to choose
"normal" returns for both 1960 and 1970. In the processing stage we work
alternatively, as elsewhere, with 5, 10, and 15 percent on capital invested. For
1960 cultivation we use Chapter 7's assumption of a "normal" return ofTHE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 235
£E12.00perfeddan per year, and for 1970 we assume, somewhat arbi-
trarily, a rise to £E18.00 per feddan per year. It rpust be emphasized that
this assumption implies some double counting because plowing and other
operations are often carried out with the assistance of factory-owned equip-
ment that is counted as capital in the processing stage.
The evaluation of the industry's fixed assets consists in adjusting the
highly understated investment at historical cost for 1960 and adding to it the
value of the fixed assets created between 1960 and 1970 (which actually went
into production), yielding capital figures of £E22.3 million and £E56.6
million for 1960 and 1970, respectively. We suspect that these estimates under-
state the value of the industry's capital at replacement cost and hence should
be viewed with caution.
Depreciation charges, also estimated for 1970 on the order of £E5mil-
lion, substantially exceeded the actual capital replacement funds appropriated
by the Ministry of Industry to the sugar industry. In this respect itis inter-
esting to note that, while the Ministry of Industry was expanding the capacity
of the sugar industry by the addition of new plants in the second half of the
1960s, it was seriously neglecting the capital replacement and modernization
needs of the industry's older factories.
Appropriations actually disbursed by the Ministry of Industry to the
sugar sector (including paper pulp and all sugar derivative industries) for
capital replacement were as follows:
Domestic Currency Foreign Currency Total
(000 LE) (000 LE) (000 LE)
1967—68 0 0 0
1968—69 384 0 384
1969—70 548 221 769
1970—71 70 0 70
1971—72 150 322 473
1973 50 381 431
Innone?of the years shown did the actual allocation even approach our
estimated requirement. The 1967 war eliminated replacements altogether for
1967—68, and significant appropriation in foreign exchange only occurred
after 1969. Moreover, while roughly two-thirds of depreciation charges should
be allocated to imported replacement equipment (since the import content of
depreciation expenditures is equivalent to two-thirds) and hence requires for-
eign exchange, only one-third of the appropriations was made in foreign ex-
change. The impression is clearly conveyed that capital replacement commands
a low priority in the Ministry of Industry's overall exchange allocations and
hence is subject to the vagaries of foreign exchange availability after the re-236 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
quirements for current production and new investments have been met. Com-
parable information obtained on other sectors of production (see Chapter 10)
suggests that the treatment of capital replacement in the sugar industry may be
quite typical.
The Competitiveness of the Integrated SugarIndustry,1960 and 1970.
Considering first the long-term position, Table 8—9 shows some negative
protection (—5 percent) for 1960, but positive protection (14 percent) for
1970. The ERPs estimated in Chapter 7, Table 7—i on the basis of current
prices for the years 1961, 1963, and 1964 average out at —19.6 percent.
At a 10 percent return to capital in the industry, the 1960 DRC was 34.1
piasters per U.S. dollar against the official exchange rate of 35.2. The average
for 1961, 1963, and 1964 (Table 7—1) was 40.0 piasters. Our calculations,
however, as already emphasized, may contain some double counting of re-
source costs. Disregarding capital costs in cultivation completely (which, on
the other hand, means an underestimation of total capital costs), the DRC
in 1960 was lower than the official exchange rate (at a 10 per-
cent return), and may have been lower even at apercent return. We can
conclude that the sugar industry was competitive in the long term at the official
exchange rate before the devaluation of 1962.
In 1970, at 10 percent return, the DRC had increased to 53.6 piasters
per U.S. dollar. The official rate was then 43.5, and thus sugar was no longer
competitive in the long term at the official rate, even when allowance is made
for some double counting of resource costs. It was the sharp rise in wage costs
that was largely responsible for the deterioration of the competitive position
of sugar. While both total (imputed) land rent and capital costs increased by
130 percent from 1960 to 1970, total wage costs rose by 217 percent. The
relatively strong wage increase is related to the rural location of the sugar
factories. Rural wages increased much more than urban industrial wages dur-
ingthe 1960s.
Thus, the industr.y was in good shape in 1960. From a long-term point of
view, it was competitive at the official exchange rate. Without the inflation
and wage increases, the heavy investments made in the industry during the
1960s would have been fully justified at the exchange rate in effect after the
devaluation of 1962. We note also that at the exchange rate of 61 piasters per
U.S. dollar the industry would, ceteris paribus, have been highly competitive
in the long term in 1970, despite the wage increases.
The position in the short term different. On the basis of the three-
year averages of the world prices for refined sugar, the ERP was 17.4 percent
in 1960 and slightly lower, at 12.2 percent, in 1970. In Chapter 7 we foundI
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was somewhat lower. The DRC (at a 10 percent return) was 40.9 piasters
per U.S. dollar in 1960, and sugar was clearly noncompetitive at the actually
ruling exchange rate. In Chapter 7 (Table 7—1 )theDRC for 1961 was found
to be 60 piasters. It should be emphasized, however, that the short-term non-
competitiveness in 1960, according to this calculation, does not justify shifting
away from sugar, even from a short-term point of view. For in the short
term, the opportunity costs of capital in processing are zero, and at a 0 percent
rate of return, the short-term DRC would have been much lower than the
official exchange rate. By 1970, despite a substantial increase in the short-
term international price, the DRCs increased, too, and a slight deterioration
occurred in the industry's competitive position (relative to the new exchange
rate) compared to 1960.
Domestic sugar prices lagged behind the uptrend in short-term interna-
tional prices between 1960 and 1970. Most of the domestic price increase to
the consumer took the form of higher excise taxes. Consequently, the industry
incurred consecutive losses during that period, averaging £E2 million per
year. In 1970—71 the industry disbursed £E43.6 million to the Treasury in
various excise taxes. Since it also received a number of "compensation" pay-
ments, its net contribution was somewhat lower. Hence the industry's consecu-
tive losses should have little meaning as an allocative criteria. On the other
hand, by reducing the capital reserves available to it, they have certainly ham-
pered the company's capital replacement program.52
Here again we run into the problem of centrally prescribed prices and
the distortive effects they have on the distribution of production and, indirectly,
of investments. To take the sugar industry as an example, the ex-factory price
has hardly been changed in twenty years, while the costs of all inputs have
naturally risen. In addition, the retail sale of sugar operates on two price
levels: a free market price and a tower price for rationed sugar. Consequently,
the sugar industry is paying four different excise taxes and sales taxes to the
Treasury and is receiving five kinds of subsidies.53 The net result is that the
sugar industry is incurring losses on its sugar operations but making profits
on the sugar derivatives. A similar situation prevails in the case of steel, textiles,
and paper, among others.
In view of the important role of rising wage costs in the deterioration of
competitiveness, it would be important to evaluate labor productivity and its
development in the factories during this period, but attempts in this direction
have been frustrating. Scanty reliable information on employment is available
other than the total number of workers employed in 1960 and 1970, and
it is not clear what categories of seasonal labor are included. Moreover, it is
uncertain to what extent the shorter working hours in industry after 1961
were applied to this rural industry, with its 150-day working season. Assum-
ing shorter hours worked and comparability of data for the two years involved,THE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 239
labor productivity measured by tons of sugar per man-year (the number of
workers employed in a year) increased by 37 percent from 1960 to 1970,
compared with an increase of only 17 percent with an assumption of un-
changed hours. In any case, the growth in productivity was small relative to
the rise in wage rates.
Sugar versus Other Crops.
Even if it were competitive in the long run at the official rate, sugar does
not necessarily have a comparative advantage vis-à-vis crops that could alter-
natively be grown on the same land. Actually, these might conceivably be
more competitive. This is the problem we are examining in the following pages.
In Chapter 7 (see Chart 7—11) an ambitious attempt was made to pre-
dict the optimal cane acreage for the years 1962 to 1968. The optimum was
defined as the hypothetical long-term response of cane• cultivators to current
international f.o.b. prices, with fluctuations in the predicted optimal area due
to fluctuations in international prices for sugar and other crops. For the period
1962 to 1968, the average predicted optimum was about 70,000 feddan, but
the average international sugar price was 3.6 U.S. cents per pound f.o.b.,
while the long-term f.o.b. price is here assumed to be 3.8 cents, or 5.3 per-
cent higher. At a 5percenthigher F-value for sugar (see Appendix A, Table
A—4), the optimal acreage would be about 73,000 feddan. In addition, we
have to allow for the difference between c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices—on average
about 15 percent (see above). At c.i.f. prices, the optimal acreage would be
about 82,000 feddan. This acreage should be compared with total actual cane
acreage, including land planted with cane for delivery to private molasses pro-
duction. The average total acreage was 115,000 feddan for these years, and
the average optimum at the long-term price should have been about 61 per-
cent of the actual acreage. Carried over to the area cultivated under contract
with the factories, this would imply an optimal area of about 58,000 feddan,
as compared with an actual average of about 95,000 feddan. In terms of sugar
production, this means a reduction to about two-thirds of actual production.
The analysis in Chapter 7, however, was based on national aggregates
and assumed that all crops competed equally against each other. This as-
sumption conceals the fact that cane is grown almost exclusively in the south-
ernmost part of the valley, where cotton is less profitable (yield is lower and
only lower-priced medium staple varieties can be grown) than in the Delta
and the northern part of the valley, and where rice is not grown at all. We
thus have to compare with a feasible alternative crop rotation, and this corn-
parison will probably show sugar in a more favorable light.
One of the most profitable rotations in Upper Egypt (according to a spe-
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assumes perennial irrigation. In the third year of this rotation, lentils or beans
might be substituted for onions, but while either of these two crops may be
more profitable in terms of domestic prices, onions have by far the lowest
DRC in terms of international prices, at least for the period 1961 to 1964
studied in Chapter 7 (see Table 7—1). Hence, we have chosen to compare
sugar with a rotation that includes one crop of onions.
Columns 2 and 5 compare income going to owner-cultivators with no
hired labor and at actual domestic prices under the two systems. Accordingly,
cane growing was almost as attractive as the alternative rotation; indeed, the
government fixed domestic cane prices so as to achieve competitiveness do-
mestically. It is true that the alternative rotation shows a somewhat higher
income than that from cane as against £E175.8 over
three years—but this figure exaggerates income, despite the exclusion of
clover, insofar as cotton yields a much lower income per feddan in the south-
ern parts of the valley than the national average on which Table 8—10 is based.
Moreover, the calculation of income from cane does not consider that, as
mentioned before, part of the costs of plowing and irrigation is carried by the
factories. Finally, it should be recalled that the alternative rotation in question
is the best possible one we could find. It can be concluded, therefore, that at
domestic prices, cane and the alternative rotation were approximately equally
attractive from the farmers' point of view.
The DRC for the alternative rotation in 1961 was 29.4 piasters per U.S.
dollar, against the official rate of 35:2. At the long-term average world price
for refined sugar, the DRC for sugar (at a 10 percent return) including culti-
vation was 34.1 in 1960. But, in view of the double counting of resource costs
for sugar (which brings the sugar DRC further down) and the exaggeration
of income from cotton (which may bring the DRC for the alternative rotation
further up), we have no clear answer to our question about the comparative
advantage of sugar versus the alternative rotation. The two may have been
about equal.
It should not be overlooked, either, that we are making a comparison
between DRCs at an (allegedly) long-term international price for sugar and
at the actual international price for the alternative crops in 1961; short-term
fluctuations in the latter could, of course, change the picture. We have not
found it feasible, however, to calculate long-term prices for the alternative
crops, but their international prices (in foreign currency) generally did not
increase from 1962 to 1968. Finally, we should also take into account that the
alternative rotation becomes more profitable the further north in Upper Egypt
the cultivation is located. It might therefore be argued that, at best, it is only
in the southernmost parts of the valley, at Aswan and Qena, that cane may
have a long-term comparative advantage over the alternative rotation. Most
of the expansion in the 1 960s did take place in Aswan and Qena, but the242 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
government also built two new raw sugar factories further to the north, in
Sohag, and it is doubtful whether this particular investment was justified.
If, therefore, we conclude that the major part of cane cultivation was
economically justified in 1960 but that some of it should have been eliminated,
we are quite in line with the predictions made in Chapter 7.
Employment and Other Aspects.
An assessment of the sugar industry must also take employment effects
into account. All our calculations assume that opportunity costs for labor are
equal to actual wages, with the implicit assumption that labor employed in the
sugar industry could find alternative employment at these wages over the long
term. If this assumption is not substantiated, the DRC of sugar falls in relation
to that of the alternative rotation, because sugar (including processing) is
much more labor-intensive than the other rotation.
The sugar industry (processing) is the second largest industrial employer,
textiles being the largest. It employs approximately 26,000 regular workers
in its factories and refineries and a much larger working force during the
short cane-crushing season, drawn mainly from rural areas and partly during
slack agricultural seasons (December to May). Thus it combines a number
of advantages often emphasized in development strategies: a high rate of labor
absorption per unit of capital invested and income created mainly in rural
areas—even in the least developed ones in Egypt—during slack seasons.
Another circumstance is the increasing demand for the by-products of
the industry, related to the development of manufacturing industry in genera].
Products such as acetic acid, alcohol, carbon dioxide, and yeast can be derived
• from, molasses. In addition, the cane residual, or bagasse, can be used for
manufacturing grain board and paper pulp, where it has a large potential if
• other cellulosic raw materials become scarcer, unless oil becomes dearer as a
substitute in the factory furnaces. Calculations of the maximum price the paper
industry could pay for bagasse reveal a net gain to the sugar industry over and
above its fuel opportunity cost of £El.82 per ton of bagasse used for paper
pulp. If 300,000 tons of bagasse were taken up by the paper industry (roughly
representtng its potential demand), it would reduce the sugar industry's DRC
by approximately 1 piaster per U.S. dollar.54
THE CEMENT INDUSTRY
The manufacture of cement was started in Egypt in 1900, when the Société
Anonyme des Ciments d'Egypte (a Belgian venture) built a factory near
Cairo. Based on large deposits of raw materials in the vicinity of the major
consuming center, the new industry was induced by the demand for cementTHE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 243
from the first Aswan Dam. Up until World War LI, its major source of energy
was imported Cardiff or German coal; World War H forced a shift to liquid
fuel.
During its first two decades the cement industry had great difficulties to
survive. Up to World War I it had to compete with foreign cement without
special protection (apart from the high cost of transport, of course), and dur-
ing the war fuel supplies were cut off. Although still without special protection
during the 1920s, the industry captured a significant share of the domestic
market in competition with imported cement. At that time two of the four
cement companies in existence today were founded.55 Yet, until the Great
Depression, the industry's share of the domestic market did not exceed 20
percent.
In 1930 a 15 percent import tariff was imposed on cement; it led to the
disappearance of cement imports during the thirties. At the outbreak of World
War II, an excise tax of £E0.70 per ton (43 percent of the domestic ex-
factory price) was imposed on cement. The excise tax remained in force after
the war, but by that time the industry had obtained a definite comparative
advantage. Despite the fact that the excise tax—imposed only on domestic
production—exceeded the import tariff and that the currency was probably
overvalued (see Chapter 3, pp. 67—68), the domestic ex-factory price was low
enough to eliminate imports. With the exemption of exported cement from the
excise tax in 1952, exports rapidly increased and had already reached a level
of 500,000 tons by 1958.
The expanded capacity was not enough to meet both domestic and for-
eign demand during the years of the first Five-Year Plan, 1960—6 1 to 1964—65,
when large construction projects (particularly the Aswan High Dam) tempo-
rarily diverted exported cement to domestic consumption (see Chart 8—5 and
Table 8—11) and cement imports became necessary. With the reduction of
investments after 1965 (see Chapter 5), the situation changed again and the
industry is now an important foreign exchange earner, second only to cotton
textiles among manufactured exports. Its net foreign exchange earnings in-
creased when two of its major imported inputs (fuel oil and paper) were
replaced products, increasing the proportion of domestically pro-
duced inputs in cement from 20 percent in 1954 to 88 percent in 1965—66.
At the same time, the industry diversified into the production of special varie-
ties of cement, first as import substitutes and later, as in the case of white
cement, as exports.
Costs, Revenues, and Competitiveness, 1954to1965-4i6.
Data on the industry's revenue and cost structure have been compiled for
1954, 1957, 1960, and 1965—66 from the consolidated accounts of the exist-244 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
CHART 8-5
Cement:Production and Trade, 1925—1970
ing four cement companies.56 On the basis of these data, estimates of the
industry's effective rate of protection and resource costs per dollar were made
at current and constant international prices (see Table 8—12, where indices of
variable input costs and productivity of labor and capital are also shown).
We have chosen to use the average export prices f.o.b. in all revenue
estimates at international prices. As Table 8—11 indicates, the average export
price tended to fall as the quantity exported increased, while the unit value
obtained from neighboring countries, represented by Saudi Arabia, remained
roughly constant over the entire period. Since the increase in exports was
achieved mostly through expansion to more remote areas (such as West Afri-
can countries), the f.o.b. price had to be lowered to absorb freight costs and
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TABLE 8—12
Cement Industry: ERPs, DRCs, Return to Capital, and
Performance Indicators
Rate of DRC at Current
Return to Capital International Prices, f.o.b.
At ActualAt Inter- (piasters per U.S. $)
Domesticnational 5% Rate10% Rate 15% Rate
Prices Prices ERP of of of
(%) (%) (%) Return Return Return
1954 18.0 34.7 —30.8 16.4 19.8 23.2
1957 10.2 35.6 —45.5 17.3 20.7 24.2
1960 7.6 19.6 —34.6 22.2 27.7 33.2
1965—66 10.9 22.5 —27.6 26.5 31.3 36.2
Indexes of Performance
(1954=100)
Labor Productivity Capital Productivity
(per hour) (per LE ofequipment)
Value Added Output Value AddedOutput Output
at Constant Inter-(tons ofat Constant Inter-(tons of (unit
nati. Prices cement) nat!. Pricescement) value)
1954 100 100 100 100 100
1957 102 104 57 55 91.
1960
(122a)
138 137 60 60 93
1965—66 117 114 88 90 132
SOURCE: Hansen and Nashashibi, NBER Working Paper No. 48, New York, 1975,
and official statistics.
a. Adjusted to 90% capacity utilization.
b. The definition of maximum capacity assumes a certain number of days per year
set aside for repair and maintenance.
During the period under review here, the profitability of the cement in-
dustry suffered from a gradual erosion through adverse price developments
for outputs and inputs. The unit value of total output at domestic prices fell in
1957 and recovered only slightly by 1960. Quantifiable material input prices
remained constant, but other inputs, such as services and spare parts, probably
increased in price. The price squeeze was accentuated in 1962 because of the
devaluation, and even more so during the period of price increases in 1965
and 1966. By 1966, ex-factory cement unit values had risen by only 16 per-
cent over 1954, against a 40 percent increase in the prices of major inputs.THE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 247
TABLE 8—12 (concluded)
DRC at Constant
International Prices, f.o.b. Exchange Rates




5% Rate10% Rate15% Rate Official
of of of BuyingEffective
Return Return Return Rate Rate
16.4 19.8 23.2 34.9 36.5 89
19.Oa 22.4a 25.7a 34.9 38.3 75
16.4 20.7 25.2 34.9 38.3 91





at at Current Total Total
Total
Number
DomesticInternati. Hourly OutputNumber of
Prices Prices Wages VolumeEmployees
of Hours
Worked
100 100 100 100 100 100
102 102 131 116 111 110
100 100 146 167 124 122
140 137 142 211 200 185
(The unit price of total output was, however, 32 percent higher than in 1954.)
The price increase in inputs was particularly notable for limestone and clay,
packing materials, and fuel oil. Hourly wages increased sharply from 1954 to
1960, but then, remarkably enough, seem to have fallen slightly between 1960
and 1966 we included pension and social insurance contributions, a
slight increase in wages would have been found). The cement industry thus
follows a pattern found in other Egyptian industries (see Chapter 4, p. 95):
the government's control over prices and its concern about keeping domestic
prices low despite rising input prices (particularly for imported inputs) has
lowered profits.
The industry's net value added evaluated at international prices is much
higher than at actual domestic prices. Export prices exceed domestic prices,
and tariff rates and premiums were gradually increased on imported materials
like spare parts and kraft paper bags. Two important traded inputs, fuel oil248 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, ANDCOMPETITIVENESSIN INDUSTRY
and packing materials, were replaced by domestic substitutes during the period
under review. For packing materials, domestic prices exceeded import prices.
Domestic production of fuel oil was expanding rapidly, and what had been an
import item until 1960 became an export item by 1965—66; in our calculations
we had to shift from c.i.f. prices to f.o.b. prices for fuel oil. This circumstance
partly explains the drop in fuel oil costs at international prices, and was a
factor in preserving the competitiveness of the cement industry.
Profitability—net profit (before income taxes) as a percentage of cap-
ital57—was also much higher when calculated at international prices during
the whole period. At actual domestic prices, profitability fell from 18.0 per-
cent in 1954 to 7.6 percent in 1960, after which it recovered to 10.9 percent
in 1965—66 (13 percent, if interest and rent payments are included in net
profits). At current international prices, profitability was 34.3 percent in 1954,
fell to 19.6 percent in 1960, and rose again to 22.5 percent in 1965—66. We
must add that, when exports were vigorously expanded in 1969 at a consider-
able decline in export prices due to longer transports, profitability at interna-
tional prices still remained at 11.6 percent (and somewhat higher if interest
and rent payments were included in net profits). It would thus seem that the
industry during the whole period was socially profitable, although profitability
shows a downward trend.
The highly "taxed" position of the cement industry as compared with a
free trade situation is reflected in the negative ERPs shown in Table 8—12.
The ERPs fluctuated between —28 and —45 percent. Similarly, the DRCs
were much lower than both the official and the effective exchange rates, even
at an imputed rate of return to capital of 15 percent. After a more than 50
percent rise from 1954 to 1965—66, DRC still did not exceed the level of the
effective rate of exchange in 1954.
Thus, during the whole period, the industry was highly competitive (even
at an overvalued exchange rate) and it is one of the failings of Egyptian in-
vestment policies during the first Five-Year Plan (1960—1965) to have per-
mitted cement exports to slip back from almost 700,000 MT in 1961 to
slightly above 150,000 MT in 1964. Expansion of capacity could have antici-
pated High Dam requirements, and reduced domestic demand after the
Dam's would have been offset by larger exports. In fact, the level
of exports attained in 1971 was almost twice as high as the peak reached
in 1961.
Productivity.
To appraise productivity of factors, Table 8—12 shows index numbers
(1954 =100)of physical output and net value added at constant 1954 inter-
national prices, both per unit of factor input (labor and capital).THE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 249
Labor productivity increased slightly, from 100 to 102, between 1954
and 1957, when the industry was expanding its capacity. The capacity expan-
sion was accompanied by a decline in capacity utilization and a sharp drop,
from 100 to 57, in productivity of capital by 1957. Note that, with value
added in 1957 adjusted to the level of capacity utilization prevailing in 1954
and 1960, labor productivity increases from 102 to 122 and capital produc-
tivity, from 57 to 68. Between 1957 and 1960, labor productivity rose further
to 138 (in terms of value added), with capital productivity remaining at 60.
These opposite changes are, of course, perfectly natural in an industry that
relies on a standard technology with little technical progress; it simply indi-
cates that capital intensity has increased and has served to increase produc-
tivity of labor. The increase in labor productivity (over 6 percent per year)
is noteworthy; it exceeded the average of 4 percent rate of increase achieved
for all industry during that period.58 Nonetheless, it was outstripped by an
even steeper rise in wages, which exceeded the average for all industry. The
cement industry seems to have experienced an improving quality of labor
through a relative increase of professional staff and qualified workers. The
proportion of employees holding academic degrees grew from 1.4 percent
in 1954 to 2.4 percent in 1960, that of middle management and technical staff,
from 2.3 percent to 4.2 percent, while that of unskilled workers fell over the
same period.
During the period 1960 to 1965—66, the trend was reversed. Labor pro-
ductivity fell by 17 percent, while capital productivity rose by 50 percent.
In this connection, we must remember that after the nationalization of the
industry in 1961 a general employment drive took place, with increased em-
ployment and reduced working hours per week. This employment drive did
not spare the cement industry, causing labor productivity to decline. While
output increased by over 26 percent from 1960 to 1965—66, the number of
employees increased by 64 percent and man-hours, by 52 percent. Alongside
the decline in labor productivity, an increase in capacity utilization beyond
its optimal theoretical maximum (the definition of maximum capacity assumes
a certain number of days per year set aside for repair and maintenance) con-
tributed to the productivity growth of capital and may have negatively afiected
labor productivity.
As labor productivity fell, wages per worker also declined. This fact is
difficult to explain, considering the general rise in wages and the improvement
in skill distribution during that period. It is possible that the industry was able
to reduce the average earnings of unskilled workers through a cut in overtime
work. There seems to have been an attempt to bring the level of wages into
line with productivity, and with the increased capacity utilization the industry
succeeded in preventing the profit rate from shrinking further.
Clearly, the cement industry's performance during the period 1960 to250 PROTECTION, CONTROLS, ANDCOMPETITIVENESSIN INDUSTRY
1965—66 was inferior to that of the preceding period. It is not obvious how
much this had to do with the change from private to public ownership. The
cause was, rather, the misconceived employment policy imposed on all big
industries. Had the cement industry remained in private hands, it probably
would have had to conform to the employment policy. There is nothing to
indicate that the industry suffered from shortages related to foreign exchange
controls. Production did suffer (see Chart 8—5), but this can be explained by
the falling off in the cement requirements of the Aswan High Dam construc-
tion, as well as the deflation that took place in 1965—66. (See Chapter 5,
pp. 112—121).
In a more indirect way, the industry seems to have been adversely af-
fected by the centralization of investment decisions into the ministry and away
from company managers. Capacity seems to have been better geared to do-
mestic and foreign demand during the 1950s than during the 1960s. Net
exports reached a peak in 1961 and declined thereafter until 1964. Central
planning failed, but it is not clear why. It is true that a decision to speed up
construction of the Aswan High Dam, and thus increase domestic demand,
was taken after the first Five-Year Plan had been worked out, but there should
have been sufficient time to revise the investment plans for the cement industry
accordingly. Did the planners deliberately sacrifice exports? Or was the whole
problem simply ignored? With free trade, decentralized investment decisions,
and profit maximization, this would probably not have happened; it would-
not have been overlooked that exports were more profitable than sales to the
domestic market. It would seem that the planners ignored, or were ignorant
of, this basic fact.-
Butwhen viewed over a longer term—the period between 1950 and
1971, for example—the overall performance of the industry is quite satis-
factory. The increase in the DRCs between 1954 and 1965—66 at constant
prices was relatively small considering the organizational changes that took
place after 1961 and the labor policy adopted by the government. The pro-
ductivity of capital increased rapidly between 1957 and 1965—66 (even after
adjustment for capacity utilization) and the industry remained highly Com-
petitive_and profitable. Its major strength, as revealed by intercountry compari-
sons of the relative cost components in this industry, derives from a higher
quality of labor available to it—for a given level of wages and capital stock—
than to some of its competitors.59 And while its competitiveness may have de-
clined somewhat from 1960 to 1965, the tighter organizational controls that
followed the 1967 war and the greater cost-consciousness of the government
may have reversed the situation.THE TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES 251
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